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Abstract
This study explores the long-run e¤ects of ination in a two-country Schumpeterian
growth model with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and R&D investment.
We nd that increasing domestic ination reduces domestic R&D investment and the
growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends
on both domestic and foreign technologies, increasing foreign ination also a¤ects the
domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally
to maximize the welfare of domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium ination rates
are generally higher than the optimal ination rates chosen by cooperative governments
who maximize the welfare of both domestic and foreign households. Under the CIA
constraint on R&D (consumption), a larger market power of rms amplies (mitigates)
this inationary bias. We use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of ina-
tion on R&D and also calibrate the two-country model to data in the Euro Area and
the US to quantify the welfare e¤ects of decreasing the ination rates from the Nash
equilibrium to the optimal level.
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1 Introduction
This study explores the long-run e¤ects of ination on economic growth and social welfare in
an open economy. We develop a two-country version of the Schumpeterian growth model and
introduce money demand into the model via a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D
investment in each country. Empirical evidence supports the view that R&D investment is
severely a¤ected by cash requirements.1 We capture these cash requirements on R&D using
a CIA constraint. Given this CIA constraint on R&D, ination that determines the oppor-
tunity cost of cash holdings a¤ects R&D investment, economic growth and social welfare.2
In an open economy, ination by a¤ecting innovation and technologies also has spillover
e¤ects across countries through international trade.3 Our model captures these spillover
e¤ects in the form of international technology spillovers and international business stealing,
which are novel channels through which cross-border monetary spillovers shape the outcome
of monetary policy competition across countries.
The results from our growth-theoretic analysis can be summarized as follows. An in-
crease in domestic ination decreases domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of
domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends on both domestic
and foreign technologies, an increase in foreign ination also a¤ects the domestic economy.
When each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of
only domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium ination rates are generally di¤erent from
the optimal ination rates chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate
welfare of domestic and foreign households. We nd that under the special case of inelastic
labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium ination rates coincide with the optimal ination rates.
However, under the more general case of elastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium ination
rates become higher than the optimal ination rates due to a cross-country spillover e¤ect
of monetary policy. The intuition can be explained as follows. When the government in a
country reduces its ination, the welfare gain from increased R&D is shared by the other
country through technology spillovers, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor supply
falls entirely on domestic households. As a result, the governments do not reduce ination
su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium.
The wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination rates depends on the mar-
ket power of rms. Under the CIA constraint on consumption, a larger markup reduces this
wedge. This nding is consistent with the interesting insight of Arseneau (2007), who shows
that the market power of rms has a dampening e¤ect on the inationary bias from monetary
policy competition analyzed in an inuential study by Cooley and Quadrini (2003). How-
ever, under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, we have the opposite result that a larger
markup amplies the inationary bias from monetary policy competition. These di¤erent
implications highlight the importance of the di¤erences between the two CIA constraints.
The main di¤erence between the CIA constraint on consumption and the CIA constraint on
R&D is that under the latter, an increase in the ination rate leads to a reallocation of labor
1We discuss these empirical studies in the literature review.
2See Chu and Cozzi (2014) for an analysis of the e¤ects of ination in a closed-economy Schumpeterian
growth model with a CIA constraint on R&D investment.
3See Coe and Helpman (1995), Bayoumi et al. (1999) and Coe et al. (2009) for empirical evidence on
technology spillovers across countries.
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from R&D to production. As a result, higher ination rates would be chosen by governments
in the Nash equilibrium to depress R&D when the negative R&D externality in the form of
a business-stealing e¤ect determined by the markup becomes stronger. In contrast, under
the CIA constraint on consumption, this reallocation e¤ect is absent because an increase
in the ination rate reduces both R&D and production by decreasing labor supply. Given
that increasing the markup worsens a monopolistic distortionary e¤ect on the production of
goods, governments would reduce ination in the Nash equilibrium to stimulate production
when this monopolistic distortion measured by the markup becomes stronger.
We use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of ination on R&D and nd
that there is a statistically signicant negative relationship between the ination rate and
the R&D share of GDP. Our preferred regression estimate shows that the semi-elasticity of
R&D with respect to ination is -0.374 (i.e., a 1% increase in the ination rate is associated
with a decrease in the R&D share of GDP by 0.374 percent). We also calibrate the two-
country model to aggregate data in the Euro Area and the US to simulate the quantitative
e¤ects of ination on R&D. We nd that the simulated semi-elasticities of R&D with respect
to ination are -0.448 in the Euro Area and -0.266 in the US. These values are in line with
the regression estimate.
In the numerical analysis of the Nash equilibrium, we consider the case in which nal
goods are produced by a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, which
introduces an international business-stealing e¤ect across countries. In other words, when
a country decreases its ination to improve domestic technology, domestic rms are able
to capture a larger share of the global market due to the substitutability of domestic and
foreign intermediate goods. This e¤ect represents a negative externality of monetary policy.
Together with the positive externality from technology spillovers, we nd that the Nash
equilibrium continues to feature an inationary bias. Therefore, we proceed to quantify the
welfare e¤ects of decreasing the ination rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal
level. We nd that the Friedman rule is optimal (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate maximizes
welfare). In this case, decreasing the ination rates from the Nash equilibrium to achieve a
zero nominal interest rate in both economies would lead to nonnegligible welfare gains that
are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 1.038% in the US and 0.249%
in the Euro Area. However, a unilateral deviation to decrease the ination rate from the
Nash equilibrium would hurt the domestic economy and only benet the foreign economy.
For example, we nd that a unilateral decrease in the ination rate in the Euro Area would
reduce its welfare by 0.213% but increase welfare in the US by 1.079%.
1.1 Literature review
Given that one of the key assumptions of our model is the presence of a CIA constraint on
R&D, here we rst review the evidence in favor of this assumption. Hall (1992), Himmelberg
and Petersen (1994), Opler et al. (1999) and Brown and Petersen (2009) nd a positive
and signicant relationship between R&D and cash ows in US rms. According to Bates
et al. (2009), the average cash-to-assets ratio in US rms increased substantially from
1980 to 2006, and this change is partly due to their increased R&D expenditures. Brown
et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence that the increase in corporate cash ow in the
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1990s drives the increase in R&D in that period. Recent studies by Brown and Petersen
(2011) and Brown et al. (2012) explain this phenomenon by providing evidence that rms
smooth R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash
reserves. Furthermore, Brown and Petersen (2014) show that rms use cash reserves to
nance R&D but not capital investment. Berentsen et al. (2012) argue that information
frictions and limited collateral value of intangible R&D capital prevent rms from nancing
R&D investment through debt or equity forcing them to fund R&D projects with cash
reserves. A recent study by Falato and Sim (2014) provides causal evidence that R&D is a
rst-order determinant of rmscash holdings. They use rm-level data in the US to show
that rmscash holdings increase (decrease) signicantly in response to a rise (cut) in R&D
tax credits,4 which vary across states and time. Furthermore, these e¤ects are stronger for
rms that have less access to debt/equity nancing. These results suggest that due to the
presence of nancing frictions, rms hold cash to nance their R&D investment. As for the
e¤ect of ination on rmscash holdings, Pinkowitz et al. (2003) and Ramirez and Tadesse
(2009) provide empirical evidence to show that ination has a negative e¤ect on cash holdings
because rms prefer to lower their holdings of cash in anticipation of it losing value during
ination.Finally, Evers et al. (2009) use rm-level panel data to show that high ination
depresses rmsR&D investment by decreasing their liquidity holdings.
This study also relates to the growth-theoretic literature of ination and economic growth,
which explores the long-run e¤ects of ination on capital investment. Stockman (1981) and
Abel (1985) provide the seminal studies of the CIA constraint on capital investment in the
Neoclassical growth model. Subsequent studies, such as Stadler (1990), Gomme (1993),
Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Wu and Zhang (1998) and Ho et al. (2007), explore the e¤ects
of monetary policy in endogenous growth models. Instead of analyzing monetary policy in
capital-based growth models, we consider an R&D-based growth model in which economic
growth is driven by R&D investment. The seminal study in this literature of ination and
innovation-driven growth is Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), who explore the e¤ects of a CIA
constraint on consumption in a Romer variety-expanding model.5 In contrast, we consider a
Schumpeterian quality-ladder model and analyze the e¤ects of ination via a CIA constraint
on R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014).6 Chu and Ji (2014) and Huang et al.
(2013) also analyze monetary policy via CIA constraints but in a Schumpeterian model with
endogenous market structure. The present study di¤ers from the closed-economy analyses
in Chu and Cozzi (2014), Chu and Ji (2014) and Huang et al. (2013) by considering a
two-country setting with international trade in intermediate goods. Given that technologies
transfer across countries through trade, monetary policy by a¤ecting domestic innovation has
a technology spillover e¤ect across countries. Our open-economy model allows us to model
and explore this technology spillover e¤ect and also an international business-stealing e¤ect
under which the unilateral choice of monetary policy in the Nash equilibrium may deviate
from globally optimal monetary policy. As Corsetti et al. (2010) wrote, ine¢ ciencies and
trade-o¤s with specic international dimensions result from cross-border monetary spillovers
4Interestingly, rmscash holdings have the opposite reaction to changes in investment tax credits.
5Chu, Lai and Liao (2012) provide an analysis of the CIA constraint on consumption in a hybrid growth
model in which economic growth in the long run is driven by both variety expansion and capital accumulation.
6See Chu and Lai (2013) for an analysis of the money-in-utility approach to model money demand in the
quality-ladder growth model.
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when these are not internalized by national monetary authorities. Indeed, we nd that the
Nash equilibrium features a signicant inationary bias. Given studies in the literature, such
as Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Wu and Zhang (1998), Aruoba et al. (2011) and Berentsen
et al. (2012), often nd that reducing ination leads to sizable welfare gains, it remains
as a puzzle why individual countries do not conduct monetary policy optimally to capture
these welfare gains. Our open-economy analysis shows that inationary bias as a result of
technology spillovers may serve as a partial explanation on why individual countries are not
able to conduct monetary policy optimally even in the long run. To our knowledge, this
is the rst study that analyzes monetary policy in a growth-theoretic framework featuring
R&D and innovation in an open economy.
Furthermore, this study relates to the new open economy macroeconomics literature
that explores monetary policy coordination and competition across countries in the pres-
ence of nominal rigidity; see for example Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), Benigno and Benigno
(2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Bergin and Corsetti (2013). These studies ana-
lyze interesting channels, such as output gap stabilization, terms of trade improvement and
production reallocation externality, and their implications on welfare gains from monetary
policy coordination. The present study complements these inuential studies by exploring
the internalization of technology spillovers as a novel channel of welfare gains from monetary
policy coordination given that R&D investment is an important component of corporate
investment that central banks pay attention to when conducting monetary policy.
Finally, this study also contributes to a small but growing literature that explores inter-
national policy cooperation in R&D-based growth models that involve technology spillovers
and international business-stealing e¤ects across countries. For example, Lai and Qiu (2003)
and Grossman and Lai (2004) analyze patent policy, whereas Impullitti (2007, 2010) and
Kondo (2013) explore R&D subsidies. This paper complements these interesting studies by
focusing on monetary policy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 documents stylized facts. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of ination. Section 5 provides a
quantitative analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of ination on R&D.
Our data set covers 34 OECD countries for the period 1960-2012 at yearly frequency. We
collect data on R&D from Eurostat/UNESCO and data on ination, population, GDP,
imports and exports from the World Development Indicators. We also use the Ginarte-
Park index of patent rights from Park (2008) and the Fraser index of economic freedom.7
We measure the level of income by real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita and the degree of
openness to trade by the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Table 1 reports the
summary statistics of these variables.
7The Ginarte-Park index is available once every 5 years for each country. We interpolate the data series
by assuming that any missing year takes on the same value as the previously available year. We also apply
the same procedure to the Fraser index.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Stdev Min Max
R&D/GDP (%) 1.8 0.9 0.3 4.8
Ination (%) 10.3 29.1 -30.2 665.4
Income 22591.5 10021.2 2431.7 74012.5
Patent rights 3.5 0.8 1.4 4.9
Economic freedom 6.9 1.2 3.4 8.8
Population (millions) 30.3 47.3 0.3 313.9
Trade/GDP (%) 34.5 21.8 0.0 166.7
Observations 648
Our theoretical model predicts a negative relationship between ination and R&D. Our
regression results are consistent with this theoretical implication. Table 2 reports the results
from our panel regressions and shows a negative relationship between ination and R&D.
Table 2: Panel regression results
Dependent variable: 100*log(R&D/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressors
Ination
-1.0827***
(0.000)
-0.5637***
(0.000)
-0.3737***
(0.000)
Income
0.0032***
(0.000)
0.0013***
(0.001)
0.0014***
(0.003)
Patent rights
11.7772***
(0.005)
17.1994***
(0.000)
12.4010***
(0.000)
Economic freedom
5.9472
(0.101)
6.5400***
(0.001)
6.9683***
(0.003)
Population
-0.1110***
(0.003)
-0.3795***
(0.004)
-0.4614***
(0.000)
Openness
-0.8109***
(0.000)
0.0404
(0.738)
-0.1199
(0.351)
Observations
Adj-R2
648
0.4325
648
0.9254
648
0.9375
Notes: p-values in parentheses. FE denotes xed e¤ects.
The regression coe¢ cients on ination are all signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1
percent level. In our preferred regression specication with both country and year xed
e¤ects, the estimated semi-elasticity of R&D with respect to ination is -0.374. In other
words, a 1% increase in the ination rate is associated with a decrease in the R&D share
of GDP by 0.374 percent. To identify whether it is the long-run or short-run component of
ination that is driving our results, we have also used the Hodrick-Prescott lter to extract
the trend and the cyclical component of ination. After repeating the regressions in Table
2, we nd that the negative relationship between R&D and ination is all due to trend
ination; see Table 3 in which we report only the coe¢ cient of trend ination to conserve
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space.8 Given that trend ination is more likely to a¤ect ination expectations9 and be
reected in the nominal interest rate that determines the opportunity cost associated with
cash-in-advance constraints, we view these results as encouraging motivating evidence for
our theory.10
Table 3: Panel regressions using HP-trend
Dependent variable: 100*log(R&D/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressor
Trend ination
p-values
Observations
Adj-R2
-1.2732***
(0.000)
648
0.4362
-0.7065***
(0.000)
648
0.9214
-0.4662***
(0.000)
648
0.9303
Notes: FE denotes xed e¤ects.
3 An open-economy monetary Schumpeterian model
In this section, we develop an open-economy version of the monetary Schumpeterian growth
model. The underlying quality-ladder model is based on the seminal work of Aghion and
Howitt (1992), and we consider a version of the quality-ladder model in Grossman and
Helpman (1991).11 We remove scale e¤ects in the Schumpeterian model by allowing for
increasing complexity in innovation as in Segerstrom (1998).12 Furthermore, we modify the
Schumpeterian model by introducing money demand via CIA constraints on consumption
and R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and extending the closed-economy model
into a two-country setting with trade in intermediate goods. The home country is denoted
with a superscript h, whereas the foreign country is denoted with a superscript f . Both
countries invest in R&D, but we allow for asymmetry across the two countries in a number
of structural parameters. Following a common treatment in this type of two-country models,
we assume labor immobility across countries. Given that the quality-ladder model has been
well-studied, we will describe the familiar components briey but discuss new features in
details. Furthermore, to conserve space, we will only present equations for the home country
h, but readers are advised to keep in mind that for each equation we present, there is an
analogous equation for the foreign country f .
8Regression results for cyclical ination are available in an unpublished appendix.
9We follow Orr et al. (1995), Ardagna et al. (2007) and Ardagna (2009) to use trend ination from the
Hodrick-Prescott lter as a proxy for ination expectations.
10Using OECD patent databases, we have also briey explored the e¤ects of ination on the number of
patent grants at USPTO by inventorscountry of origin from 1976 to 2013 and found a signicant negative
relationship between the two variables; regression results are available in an unpublished appendix.
11See also Segerstrom et al. (1990) for another seminal study of the quality-ladder model.
12See for example Jones (1999) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models.
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3.1 Household
In each country, there is a representative household. In country h, the population size is
Nht , and its law of motion is _N
h
t = nN
h
t , where n > 0 is the exogenous population growth
rate. Total population in the world is Nt = Nht + N
f
t , where N
f
t is the population size in
country f , which is assumed to have the same population growth rate n. The lifetime utility
function of the household in country h is given by13
Uh =
Z 1
0
e t

ln cht + 
h ln(1  lht )

dt, (1)
where cht denotes per capita consumption of nal goods and l
h
t denotes the supply of labor
per person in country h at time t. The parameters  > 0 and h  0 determine respectively
subjective discounting and leisure preference. We allow for asymmetry in h across the two
countries.
The asset-accumulation equation expressed in real terms (i.e., denominated in units of
nal goods) is given by
_aht + _m
h
t = (r
h
t   n)aht   (ht + n)mht + iht bht + wht lht + ht   cht . (2)
aht is the real value of nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic rms)
owned by each member of the household in country h. rht is the real interest rate in country h.
According to the Fisher identity, it is equal to rht = i
h
t   ht , where iht is the nominal interest
rate and ht is the ination rate in country h. m
h
t is the real value of domestic currency held by
each member of the household partly to facilitate the payment of consumption goods that are
purchased domestically and partly to facilitate money lending to R&D entrepreneurs subject
to the following constraint: bht + 
hcht  mht , where bht is the real value of domestic currency
borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs to nance their R&D investment and h  0 parameterizes
the strength of the CIA constraint on consumption. As the household accumulates more
money mht , its money lending b
h
t to R&D entrepreneurs also increases, and the rate of return
on bht is the nominal interest rate i
h
t .
14 wht is the real wage rate in country h. Finally, 
h
t is
the real value of a lump-sum transfer (or tax if ht < 0) from the government to each member
of the household.
The household maximizes (1) subject to (2) and bht +
hcht  mht , which becomes a binding
constraint in equilibrium. From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality condition
for per capita consumption in country h is
cht =
1
ht (1 + 
hiht )
, (3)
13Here we assume that the utility function is based on per capita utility. Alternatively, one can assume
that the utility function is based on aggregate utility in which case the e¤ective discount rate simply becomes
  n.
14It can be shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on bht must be equal to i
h
t . The
intuition can be explained as follows. The opportunity cost for the household to hold cash is the nominal
interest rate. Therefore, in order for the household to be willing to lend cash to rms, it must be the case
that rms pay the nominal interest rate in return. If rms pay less than the nominal interest rate, the
household would not lend any cash to rms. If they pay more than the nominal interest rate, the household
would want to lend an innite amount of cash to rms.
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where ht is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). The optimality condition for labor
supply is
lht = 1 
hcht (1 + 
hiht )
wht
. (4)
Finally, the intertemporal optimality condition is
  _
h
t
ht
= rht     n. (5)
In the case of a constant nominal interest rate ih, (3) and (5) simplify to the familiar Euler
equation: _cht =c
h
t = r
h
t     n.
We consider a global nancial market. In this case, the real interest rates in the two
countries must be equal such that rht = r
f
t = rt.
15 Given that the distribution of nancial
assets across the two countries is indeterminate, we follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010)
to assume that monopolistic rms created by innovation of domestic entrepreneurs are owned
by the domestic household. Furthermore, in our model, there is no incentive for the household
to hold foreign currency even when the nominal interest rates di¤er across countries. The
reason is that given the same real interest rate across countries as a result of the global
nancial market, di¤erences in the nominal interest rates are due to di¤erences in the ination
rates, which in turn equal percent changes in the nominal exchange rate because the law of
one price holds in our model as we discuss below. Given that the uncovered interest rate
parity holds in our model, a small transaction cost on foreign exchange would discourage the
household from holding foreign currency.16
3.2 Final goods
Final goods for consumption in the two countries are produced by competitive rms that
aggregate two types of intermediate goods using a standard CES aggregator given by
Ct =
h
(Y ht )
( 1)= + (1  )(Y ft )( 1)=
i=( 1)
, (6)
where Y ht and Y
f
t denote intermediate goods produced by country h and country f , respec-
tively. The parameter  2 (0; 1) determines the importance of country hs intermediate goods
in the production of nal goods. The parameter  > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods produced by the two countries. From prot maximization, the
conditional demand functions for Y ht and Y
f
t are respectively
Y ht =


phy;t

Ct, (7)
15The nominal interest rates in the two countries would still be di¤erent if the ination rates di¤er across
countries.
16However, if the uncovered interest rate parity does not hold, then the household may want to use foreign
currency to satisfy the CIA constraint, which is usually ruled out in the literature.
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Y ft =
 
1  
pfy;t
!
Ct, (8)
where phy;t is the price of Y
h
t , and p
f
y;t is the price of Y
f
t . Both of these prices are expressed
in units of nal goods.
Suppose the nominal price of nal goods in country h is phc;t, which is denominated in
units of currency in country h. Then, because nal goods can be freely traded across the two
countries,17 the law of one price holds such that the nominal price of nal goods denominated
in units of currency in country f is pfc;t = "tp
h
c;t, where "t is the nominal exchange rate.
3.3 Intermediate goods
Intermediate goods are also produced by competitive rms. Competitive rms in country
h produce Y ht by aggregating a unit continuum of di¤erentiated domestic inputs X
h
t (j) for
j 2 [0; 1]. The standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator is given by18
Y ht = exp
Z 1
0
lnXht (j)dj

. (9)
From prot maximization, the conditional demand functions for Xht (j) is
Xht (j) =
phy;t
phx;t(j)
Y ht , (10)
where phx;t(j) is the price (denominated in units of nal goods) ofX
h
t (j). Finally, the standard
price index of Y ht is p
h
y;t = exp
R 1
0
ln phx;t(j)dj

.19
3.4 Di¤erentiated inputs
In country h, there is a unit continuum of di¤erentiated inputs indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. In
each industry j 2 [0; 1], there is an industry leader who dominates the market temporarily
until the arrival of the next innovation.20 The industry leader employs domestic workers to
produce Xht (j).
21 Specically, the production function is given by
Xht (j) = (z
h)q
h
t (j)Lhx;t(j), (11)
17Even if nal goods cannot be traded, the fact that intermediate goods are freely traded is su¢ cient to
ensure pfc;t = "tp
h
c;t.
18Our results are robust to a more general CES aggregator, under which the monopolistic markup of
di¤erentiated inputs may be determined by the elasticity of substituition. For simplicity, we focus on the
Cobb-Douglas aggregator.
19Derivations available in an unpublished appendix.
20This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature; see Cozzi (2007) for a discussion.
21In order to keep the analysis tractable, we do not consider production o¤shoring in this study; see Chu,
Cozzi and Furukawa (2013) for a North-South analysis of monetary policy with production o¤shoring.
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where Lhx;t(j) denotes production labor in industry j of country h. z
h > 1 is the step size of
innovation in country h, and we allow this parameter to di¤er across countries. qht (j) is the
number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t.22
Given (zh)q
h
t (j) in industry j, the leaders marginal cost function for the production of
Xht (j) is
mcht (j) =
wht
(zh)q
h
t (j)
. (12)
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to markup pricing. This markup ratio is assumed
to equal the step size zh of innovation in Grossman and Helpman (1991). Here we allow for
variable patent breadth similar to Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) by assum-
ing that the markup h > 1 is a policy instrument determined by the patent authority.23
For simplicity, we focus on the case in which h = f = , and this assumption can be
partly justied by the harmonization of patent protection across countries as a result of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) e¤ective since
1996.24 Furthermore, given that patent policy is not designed by the monetary authority in
reality,25 we treat  as exogenous when deriving optimal monetary policy.
Given the markup ratio , the price of Xht (j) is
phx;t(j) = 
wht
(zh)q
h
t (j)
. (13)
Therefore, the real value of monopolistic prot earned by the industry leader j in country h
is
!ht (j) =
  1

phx;t(j)X
h
t (j) =
  1

phy;tY
h
t , (14)
where the second equality follows from (10). Finally, wage income paid to industry js
workers in country h is
wht L
h
x;t(j) =
1

phx;t(j)X
h
t (j) =
1

phy;tY
h
t . (15)
22It is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of quality improvement as in Peretto (1998).
23To model patent breadth, we rst make a standard assumption in the literature, see for example Howitt
(1999) and Segerstrom (2000), that once the incumbent leaves the market, she cannot threaten to reenter the
market due to a reentry cost. As a result of the incumbent stopping production, the entrant is able to charge
the unconstrained monopolistic markup, which is innity due to the Cobb-Douglas specication in (9), under
the case of complete patent breadth. However, with incomplete patent breadth, potential imitation limits
the markup. Specically, the presence of monopolistic prots attracts imitation; therefore, stronger patent
protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without the threat of imitation. This
formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the
ability of the patentee to raise price".
24See Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) for an analysis of the harmonization of patent
protection under TRIPS.
25See Chu (2008) for a discussion of the political process in determining patent policy in the US.
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3.5 R&D
Denote vht (j) as the real value of the monopolistic rm j 2 [0; 1] in country h. Because
!ht (j) = !
h
t for j 2 [0; 1] from (14), vht (j) = vht in a symmetric equilibrium that features an
equal arrival rate of innovation across industries within a country.26 In this case, the familiar
no-arbitrage condition for vht is
rt =
!ht + _v
h
t   ht vht
vht
. (16)
This condition equates the real interest rate rt in the global nancial market to the rate
of return per unit of nancial asset. The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prot
!ht , (b) any potential capital gain _v
h
t , and (c) expected capital loss 
h
t v
h
t due to creative
destruction, where ht is the arrival rate of the next innovation in country h.
There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by  2 [0; 1] in each country,
and they hire R&D labor for innovation. In country h, entrepreneur s wage payment to
R&D labor is wht L
h
r;t(). However, to facilitate this wage payment, the entrepreneur needs
to borrow domestic currency27 from the domestic household.28 The real value of money
borrowed is bht () = 
hwht L
h
r;t(), where 
h 2 (0; 1] is the fraction of wage payment that
requires the use of currency. We follow the formulation in Chu and Cozzi (2014) to impose a
CIA constraint on R&D such that the cost of borrowing is iht b
h
t (). Therefore, the total cost
of R&D is (1 + hiht )w
h
t L
h
r;t(). Free entry implies zero expected prot such that
vht 
h
t () = (1 + 
hiht )w
h
t L
h
r;t(), (17)
where the rm-level arrival rate of innovation is ht () = '
h
tL
h
r;t(). To model two sources of
R&D externality commonly discussed in the literature, we assume 'ht = '=[(L
h
r;t)
Zht ], where
Lhr;t is aggregate R&D labor. Z
h
t denotes aggregate technology in country h capturing the
e¤ect of increasing innovation complexity.29 This formulation of increasing R&D di¢ culty
also removes scale e¤ects in the innovation process as in Segerstrom (1998).30 The parameter
 2 [0; 1) measures the degree of R&D duplication externality as in Jones and Williams
26We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model.
27Given that this is wage payment to workers in the domestic economy, the wage payment is naturally paid
in domestic currency. Furthermore, there is no incentive for the entrepreneurs to borrow foreign currency
and convert it into domestic currency even when the nominal interest rates di¤er across countries because
the uncovered interest rate parity holds in our model.
28Due to the static nature of the R&D sector in this workhorse model, we cannot deal with the case in
which R&D entrepreneurs accumulate cash holdings. However, even if we allow entrepreneurs to accumulate
cash, ination would have the same positive e¤ect on the cost of R&D as in our current setting in which
entrepreneurs borrow cash from the household because the opportunity cost of using cash to nance R&D
is determined by the nominal interest rate in both cases.
29See Venturini (2012) for empirical evidence based on industry-level data that supports the presence of
increasing R&D di¢ culty.
30Segerstrom (1998) considers an industry-specic index of R&D di¢ culty. Here we consider an aggregate
index of R&D di¢ culty to simplify notation without altering the aggregate results of our analysis.
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(2000).31 The parameter ' > 0 determines R&D productivity. The aggregate arrival rate of
innovation in country h is
ht =
Z 1
0
ht ()d =
'(Lhr;t)
1 
Zht
. (18)
3.6 Monetary authority
The nominal value of the aggregate money supply in country h is Mht . Then, the real value
of the aggregate money balance in country h is mhtN
h
t = M
h
t =p
h
c;t, where p
h
c;t is the price
of nal goods denominated in units of currency in country h. Therefore, the growth rate
of per capita real money balance is _mht =m
h
t = _M
h
t =M
h
t   n   ht , where ht  _phc;t=phc;t is
the ination rate of the price of nal goods in country h. The monetary policy instrument
that we consider is the ination rate ht , which is exogenously chosen by the monetary
authority in country h. Given ht , the nominal interest rate in country h is endogenously
determined according to the Fisher identity iht = 
h
t + rt, where rt is the real interest rate
in the global nancial market. Then, the growth rate of the nominal money supply Mht in
country h is endogenously determined according to _Mht =M
h
t = _m
h
t =m
h
t +n+
h
t . Finally, the
monetary authority in country h returns the seigniorage revenue as a real lump-sum transfer
htN
h
t =
_Mht =p
h
c;t = [ _m
h
t + (
h
t + n)m
h
t ]N
h
t to the domestic household.
3.7 Aggregate economy
Substituting (11) into (9) yields the aggregate production function for Y ht given by
Y ht = Z
h
t L
h
x;t, (19)
where aggregate technology Zht in country h is dened as
Zht  exp
Z 1
0
qht (j)dj ln z
h

= exp
Z t
0
hd ln z
h

. (20)
The second equality of (20) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of (20)
with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology in country h given by
_Zht
Zht
= ht ln z
h =
(Lhr;t)
1 
Zht
' ln zh. (21)
One can also derive the analogous equations for fY ft ; Zft ; _Zft =Zft g.
Proposition 1 Given constant nominal interest rates fih; ifg in the two countries, the ag-
gregate economy gradually converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path along which
each variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) rate.
31We assume  to be the same across countries in order to ensure that Zht and Z
f
t grow at the same rate
in the long run. Equation (23) shows that a balanced growth path would not exist (unless  ! 1) if Zht and
Zft grow at di¤erent rates in the long run.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
For the dynamics of the model, Proposition 1 shows that the aggregate economy gradually
converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path (BGP). On the BGP, the share of
labor allocated to each sector is stationary, and technologies fZht ; Zft g grow at a constant
rate. Consequently, (21) and its analogous equation for _Zft =Z
f
t imply that (L
h
r;t)
1 =Zht and
(Lfr;t)
1 =Zft must be stationary in the long run. Given that the share of labor allocated to
each sector is stationary on the BGP, Lhr;t=N
h
t and L
f
r;t=N
f
t are also stationary in the long
run. This analysis implies that the long-run growth rate of home and foreign technologies is
given by
gk 
_Zkt
Zkt
= k ln zk = (1  )n, (22)
where k 2 fh; fg and the steady-state equilibrium arrival rates of innovation are determined
by exogenous parameters such that h = (1  )n= ln zh and f = (1  )n= ln zf . Di¤eren-
tiating the log of (6) with respect to time yields the growth rate of aggregate consumption
given by
_Ct
Ct
=
1
(Y ht )
( 1)= + (1  )(Y ft )( 1)=
"
(Y ht )
( 1)= _Y
h
t
Y ht
+ (1  )(Y ft )( 1)=
_Y ft
Y ft
#
. (23)
On the BGP, the growth rate of nal goods is
_Y kt
Y kt
=
_Zkt
Zkt
+
_Lkx;t
Lkx;t
= gk + n = (2  )n, (24)
where k 2 fh; fg. Therefore, the long-run growth rate of aggregate consumption is gC =
(2   )n, and the long-run growth rate of per capita consumption in the two countries is
ghc = g
f
c = (1  )n.
3.8 Steady-state equilibrium labor allocations
We relegate the denition of the equilibrium to Appendix A. Here we sketch out the deriva-
tions of the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations in country h. Integrating (17) over 
yields the free-entry condition in the R&D sector given by vht 
h
t = (1+
hiht )w
h
t L
h
r;t. Equation
(16) implies that the balanced-growth value of an innovation is vht = !
h
t =(r ghv +h), where
ghv denotes the steady-state growth rate of v
h
t . It can be shown that r ghv =  on the BGP.32
Substituting these conditions along with (14) and (15) into the R&D free-entry condition
yields
lhr
lhx
=
  1
1 + hih
h
+ h
, (25)
32Derivations available in an unpublished appendix.
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where lhr;t  Lhr;t=Nht and lhx;t  Lhx;t=Nht denote per capita labor allocations. The second
condition for solving the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations is the resource constraint
on labor given by
lh = lhx + l
h
r . (26)
To determine the steady-state equilibrium per capita labor supply lh, we apply ahtN
h
t = v
h
t
(i.e., the assumption of domestic innovations being owned by the domestic household) on
(2) such that
_vht = r
h
t v
h
t + i
h
t b
h
tN
h
t + w
h
t L
h
r;t + w
h
t L
h
x;t   chtNht , (27)
where we have also used ht = _m
h
t + (
h
t +n)m
h
t and the resource constraint on labor in (26).
Applying r   ghv =  and (17) on (27) yields
chtN
h
t = v
h
t + 
h
t v
h
t + w
h
t L
h
x;t = p
h
y;tY
h
t , (28)
where the second equality follows from vht = !
h
t =( + 
h), (14) and (15). Substituting (28)
and (15) into (4) yields
lh = 1  h(1 + hih)lhx. (29)
Solving (25), (26) and (29) yields the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium labor allocations in country h are given by
lhr =
 1
1+hih
h
+h
1 + h(1 + hih) +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (30)
lhx =
1
1 + h(1 + hih) +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (31)
lh =
1 +  1
1+hih
h
+h
1 + h(1 + hih) +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (32)
where ih = h + r = h + + n+ ghc = 
h + + (2  )n, which is increasing in h.33
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (30) shows that R&D labor lhr is decreasing in i
h and h (given that ih =
h + + (2  )n) via the CIA constraint on R&D (captured by h) and the CIA constraint
on consumption (captured by h). The intuition of the e¤ect via h is that a higher nominal
interest rate increases the cost of R&D, which in turn causes R&D entrepreneurs to reduce
their R&D spending. The intuition of the e¤ect via h is that a higher nominal interest
rate increases the cost of consumption relative to leisure; as a result, the household increases
leisure and decreases labor supply, which also reduces R&D labor. Equation (31) shows that
33Empirical evidence supports a positive long-run relationship between ination and the nominal interest
rate; see for example Mishkin (1992) for US data and Booth and Ciner (2001) for European data.
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ih and h have a positive e¤ect on production labor lhx via the CIA constraint on R&D but a
negative e¤ect on lhx via the CIA constraint on consumption. The positive e¤ect of i
h and h
on lhx via 
h is due to the reallocation of labor from the R&D sector to the production sector.
The negative e¤ect of ih and h on lhx via 
h is due to the reduced supply of labor. Equation
(32) shows that labor supply lh is decreasing in ih and h via both CIA constraints.
3.9 Ination and economic growth
We now explore the e¤ects of ination on the growth rate of technologies. To facilitate this
analysis, we dene a transformed variable &ht  Zht =(Nht )1 , and its growth rate is given by
_&ht
&ht

_Zht
Zht
  (1  )
_Nht
Nht
=
_Zht
Zht
  (1  )n. (33)
Using the steady-state equilibrium condition _Zht =Z
h
t = (1  )n, we can rewrite (21) as
&h =
' ln zh
(1  )n(l
h
r )
1 , (34)
where the steady-state equilibrium R&D labor lhr is decreasing in the domestic nominal
interest rate ih and the domestic ination rate h as shown in (30). Therefore, &h is also
decreasing in ih and h. In order for &h to decrease to a lower steady-state value in the
long run, it must be the case that in the short run, _&ht =&
h
t < 0, which in turn implies that
_Zht =Z
h
t < (1   )n. In other words, a permanent increase in the domestic ination rate
leads to a temporary decrease in the growth rate of domestic technology and a permanent
decrease in the level of domestic technology &h. An analogous analysis would show that a
permanent increase in the foreign ination rate leads to a temporary decrease in the growth
rate of foreign technology and a permanent decrease in the level of foreign technology &f .
4 Ination and social welfare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of domestic and foreign ination on social welfare. On
the BGP, the long-run welfare of the representative household in country h is given by
Uh =
1


ln ch0 +
ghc

+ h ln(1  lh)

. (35)
For analytical tractability, we focus on the special case of  ! 1 in (6) in this qualitative
analysis.34 Substituting (7) into (28) yields cht = Ct=N
h
t . Substituting this condition along
with (6) and ghc = (1  )n into (35) yields
Uh = lnC0 + 
h ln(1  lh) =  lnY h0 + (1  ) lnY f0 + h ln(1  lh), (36)
34We will consider the general case of  > 1 in the subsequent quantitative analysis.
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where we have dropped all the exogenous terms. The balanced-growth level of nal goods is
given by
Y k0 = Z
k
0 l
k
xN
k
0 , (37)
where k 2 fh; fg. The balanced-growth level of technologies is given by
Zk0 =
(Nk0 )
1 ' ln zk
(1  )n (l
k
r )
1 , (38)
where k 2 fh; fg. Substituting (37) and (38) into (36) yields
Uh = [ln lhx + (1  ) ln lhr ] + (1  )[ln lfx + (1  ) ln lfr ] + h ln(1  lh), (39)
where we have once again dropped the exogenous terms. In (39), flhx; lhr ; lhg depend on ih
and h and flfx; lfr g depend on if and f .
In the following subsections, we will derive (a) the ination rate that is unilaterally chosen
by each government to maximize domestic welfare and (b) the ination rates that are chosen
by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of the two countries. Given
that the results di¤er under the following three scenarios, we analyze them separately. In
Section 4.1, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply. In Section 4.2, we consider elastic
labor supply with only the CIA constraint on R&D investment. In Section 4.3, we consider
elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on consumption.
4.1 Inelastic labor supply
In this subsection, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply (i.e., h = f = 0). In this
case, (30) and (31) simplify to
lhr =
 1
1+hih
h
+h
1 +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (40)
lhx =
1
1 +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (41)
and lh = 1. Due to inelastic labor supply, the e¤ect of ination operates solely through the
CIA constraint on R&D investment. By analogous inference, one can also derive flfr ; lfxg.
Substituting (40), (41) and their analogous equations for flfr ; lfxg into (39) and then
di¤erentiating Uh with respect to h, we obtain the following domestic ination rate that is
unilaterally chosen by the government in country h to maximize the domestic households
welfare:
hne =
1
h

  1
1  
h
+ h
  1

  r, (42)
where r =  + (2   )n and h = (1   )n= ln zh are determined by exogenous parameters.
By analogous inference, one can also derive the foreign ination rate fne that is unilaterally
chosen by country fs government to maximize the welfare of the household in country f .
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We refer to the pair fhne; fneg as the Nash-equilibrium ination rates because each gov-
ernment pursues its own objective taking the other governments action as given. An inter-
esting observation is that fne is also the foreign ination rate that would be preferred by the
government in country h. To see this result, we di¤erentiate Uh with respect to f and nd
that the optimal foreign ination rate for country h is also fne. Finally, we consider cooper-
ative governments who choose fh; fg to maximize aggregate welfare dened as Uh + U f ,
and we refer to these ination rates as the optimal ination rates denoted as fh ; fg. We
nd that fh ; fg = fhne; fneg. In other words, the unilateral action of each government
gives rise to an internationally optimal outcome; however, in the next subsection, we will
show that this special result is due to the restriction of inelastic labor supply. We summarize
the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium ination rate unilaterally
chosen by each government coincides with the optimal ination rate chosen by cooperative
governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two countries.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The comparative statics of the optimal ination rates can be summarized as follows. The
optimal ination rate in country h is decreasing in the domestic innovation step size zh but
increasing in the degree of duplication externality  and the size of the markup . The
intuition of these results can be easily understood if we compare the equilibrium allocation
to the socially optimal allocation. It can be shown that the rst-best optimal ratio of R&D
to production labor is given by35
elhrelhx = (1  ) g
h
gh + 
, (43)
where gh = (1  )n. Then, we use h = gh= ln zh to rewrite (25) and obtain the equilibrium
ratio of R&D to production labor given by
lhr
lhx
=
  1
1 + hih
gh
gh +  ln zh
. (44)
Comparing (43) and (44), we see that a larger zh causes the equilibrium ratio lhr =l
h
x to
decrease relative to the optimal ratio elhr =elhx worsening the surplus-appropriability problem,36
which is a positive externality. In this case, the optimal policy response is to reduce ination
to stimulate R&D. Second, a larger  causes the equilibrium ratio lhr =l
h
x to increase relative
to the optimal ratio elhr =elhx capturing the negative duplication externality. In this case, the
optimal policy response is to raise ination to depress R&D. Finally, a larger  also causes the
equilibrium ratio lhr =l
h
x to increase relative to the optimal ratio elhr =elhx due to a strengthening of
35Derivations available in an unpublished appendix.
36The surplus-appropriability problem refers to the case in which R&D entrepreneurs do not take into
account the external benets to consumers when new innovations occur.
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the (domestic) business-stealing e¤ect,37 which is another source of negative R&D externality.
In this case, the optimal policy response is also to raise ination to depress equilibrium R&D.
4.2 Elastic labor supply with CIA on R&D only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply (i.e., h > 0) with the CIA
constraint on R&D. However, we remove the CIA constraint on consumption by setting
h = f = 0. In this case, (30), (31) and (32) simplify to
lhr =
 1
1+hih
h
+h
1 + h +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (45)
lhx =
1
1 + h +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (46)
lh =
1 +  1
1+hih
h
+h
1 + h +  1
1+hih
h
+h
. (47)
By analogous inference, one can also derive flfr ; lfxg.
Substituting (45)-(47) and their analogous equations for flfr ; lfxg into (39) and then di¤er-
entiating Uh with respect to h, we obtain the following domestic ination that is unilaterally
chosen by the government in country h to maximize the domestic households welfare:
hne =
1
h

1


 + h
1 + h

  1
1  
h
+ h
  1

  r, (48)
where r =  + (2   )n and h = (1   )n= ln zh. The analogous ination rate unilaterally
chosen by country fs government to maximize the welfare of the household in country f is
given by
fne =
1
f

1
1  

1   + f
1 + f

  1
1  
f
+ f
  1

  r, (49)
where f = (1  )n= ln zf . We next consider cooperative governments who choose fh; fg
to maximize aggregate welfare Uh + U f , and the resulting optimal ination rates are given
by
h =
1
h

1
2

2 + h
1 + h

  1
1  
h
+ h
  1

  r, (50)
f =
1
f

1
2(1  )

2(1  ) + f
1 + f

  1
1  
f
+ f
  1

  r. (51)
We see that hne > 
h
 and 
f
ne > 
f
 . In other words, the unilateral action of each
government generally leads to excessively high ination in the Nash equilibrium due to
37The business-stealing e¤ect refers to the case in which R&D entrepreneurs do not take into account the
external losses su¤ered by current industry leaders when new innovations occur.
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a cross-country spillover e¤ect of monetary policy under elastic labor supply. This e¤ect
captures the inationary bias due to monetary policy competition in Cooley and Quadrini
(2003). However, the intuition of our model is di¤erent and can be explained as follows.
When a country lowers its ination rate, the welfare gain from a higher level of technology is
shared by the other country, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor supply (lh in (47)
is decreasing in h) falls entirely on the domestic household. As a result, the government
does not lower the domestic ination rate su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium. In contrast,
cooperative governments would internalize the welfare gain from a higher level of technology
in the other country.
Taking the di¤erence of (48) and (50) yields the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium
and optimal ination rates in country h given by
hne   h =
  1
h + 1
h
2h(1  )
h
+ h
> 0, (52)
which is increasing in the markup . Intuitively, a larger markup strengthens the negative
business-stealing externality as discussed before, and the resulting optimal policy response
is to increase ination to reduce R&D. However, in the Nash equilibrium, the cost of higher
ination that depresses the level of technology is shared by the other country. As a result,
a noncooperative government would increase ination more aggressively than a cooperative
government would, and the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination rates
is monotonically increasing in the market power of rms. This result di¤ers from the in-
teresting result in Arseneau (2007), who shows that a larger market power of rms tends
to reduce the inationary bias. The di¤erent implications between the two studies are due
to the di¤erent CIA constraints. We have analyzed a CIA constraint on R&D, whereas
Arseneau (2007) analyzes a CIA constraint on consumption. In the next subsection, we
show that our model also delivers the insight of Arseneau (2007) under a CIA constraint on
consumption.
Proposition 4 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on R&D, the Nash-
equilibrium ination rate unilaterally chosen by each government is higher than the optimal
ination rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two
countries. The degree of this inationary bias is monotonically increasing in the market
power of rms.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.3 Elastic labor supply with CIA on consumption only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply (i.e., h > 0) with the CIA
constraint on consumption. However, we remove the CIA constraint on R&D by setting
h = f = 0. In this case, (30), (31) and (32) simplify to
lhr =
(  1)h=(+ h)
1 + h(1 + hih) + (  1)h=(+ h) , (53)
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lhx =
1
1 + h(1 + hih) + (  1)h=(+ h) , (54)
lh =
1 + (  1)h=(+ h)
1 + h(1 + hih) + (  1)h=(+ h) . (55)
By analogous inference, one can also derive flfr ; lfxg.
Substituting (53)-(55) and their analogous equations for flfr ; lfxg into (39) and then di¤er-
entiating Uh with respect to h, we obtain the following domestic ination that is unilaterally
chosen by the government in country h to maximize the domestic households welfare:
hne =
1
h

1
(2  )
+ h
+ h
  1

  r, (56)
where r =  + (2   )n and h = (1   )n= ln zh. The analogous ination rate unilaterally
chosen by country fs government to maximize the welfare of the household in country f is
given by
fne =
1
f

1
(1  )(2  )
+ f
+ f
  1

  r, (57)
where f = (1  )n= ln zf . We also consider cooperative governments who choose fh; fg
to maximize aggregate welfare Uh + U f , and the resulting optimal ination rates are given
by
h =
1
h

1
2(2  )
+ h
+ h
  1

  r, (58)
f =
1
f

1
2(1  )(2  )
+ f
+ f
  1

  r, (59)
We see that hne > 
h
 and 
f
ne > 
f
 . As in the previous case, the unilateral action of
each government leads to excessively high ination in the Nash equilibrium due to the cross-
country spillover e¤ect of monetary policy. However, the degree of this inationary bias is
now decreasing in the markup . To see this result, we take the di¤erence of (56) and (58)
and derive the following wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination rates in
country h:
hne   h =
h + =
h + 
1
2h(2  ) > 0, (60)
which shows that a larger markup  would reduce the inationary bias capturing the damp-
ening e¤ect of monopolistic distortion discussed in Arseneau (2007). It is useful to note
from (53) and (54) that under the CIA constraint on consumption, increasing ination does
not lead to a reallocation of labor from R&D to production but decreases both R&D and
production instead. Equation (54) also shows that when the markup  increases, production
labor decreases. In this case, the optimal policy response is to decrease ination in order
to stimulate production. Given that the ination rate in the Nash equilibrium is higher to
begin with, the government needs to reduce ination more aggressively in order to achieve
the same proportional increase in production lhx, which is a decreasing and convex function
in ih (and hence h).
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Proposition 5 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on consumption, the
Nash-equilibrium ination rate unilaterally chosen by each government is higher than the
optimal ination rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of
the two countries. The degree of this inationary bias is monotonically decreasing in the
market power of rms.
Proof. See Appendix A.
5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis of the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination
across countries. We consider the general case with elastic labor supply and both CIA
constraints on R&D and consumption. The two-country model features the following set
of parameters f; n; ; ; zh; zf ; h; f ; ; s; ; h; f ; h; f ; h; fg.38 Given the calibrated
parameter values, we then perform a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of ination in the
two economies.
To make this quantitative analysis more realistic, we allow for a non-unitary elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods.39 We consider a value of 2.46 for  that
is within the range of empirical estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006). For the value
of n, we set it to the average long-run growth rate of the number of R&D scientists and
engineers40 in the US41 and the Euro Area42. As for the markup , we set it to 1.28,
which corresponds to an intermediate value of the empirical estimates reported in Jones and
Williams (2000). We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set the annual discount rate
 to 0.05 and the time between innovation arrivals f1=h; 1=fg to 3 years, which allows
us to pin down the values of fzh; zfg = fexp(g=h); exp(g=f )g given g. As for the leisure
parameters fh; fg, we calibrate them by setting the per capita supply of labor flh; lfg
to a standard value of 0.33. For the rest of the parameters, we calibrate the model using
aggregate data from 1999 to 200743 in the US and the Euro Area. To x notation, we
consider the US as the home country h and the Euro Area as the foreign country f . We
use data on the relative size of GDP in the US and the Euro Area to calibrate  by setting
(phyY
h +whLhr )=(p
h
yY
h +whLhr + p
f
yY
f +wfLfr ) = 0:58.
44 As for the relative population size,
we dene s  Nht =Nt and calibrate it to data.45 We also normalize N0 to unity. The average
38It is useful to note that ' does not a¤ect the other calibrated parameter values and the steady-state
welfare e¤ects.
39We present the equations of the non-cooperative governmentsbest-response functions and their welfare
functions in an unpublished appendix.
40In the model, the long-run growth rate of technologies is driven by the growth rate of R&D labor as
implied by (21); i.e., _Zht =Z
h
t = (1  ) _Lhr;t=Lhr;t and _Zft =Zft = (1  ) _Lfr;t=Lfr;t. Therefore, we set the value of
n to the average long-run value of _Lhr;t=L
h
r;t and _L
f
r;t=L
f
r;t, instead of the population growth rate.
41Data source: National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics.
42Data source: Eurostat.
43We do not include data from 2008 onwards due to the international nancial crises.
44Data source: Eurostat.
45Data sources: Eurostat, and OECD Labor Force Statistics.
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growth rate of total factor productivity in the US and the Euro Area is 0.7%,46 and we use
this value to calibrate the duplication externality parameter  = 1  g=n. We calibrate the
consumption-CIA parameters fh; fg to the ratios of M1 to consumption in the US and
the Euro Area.47 The average ination rates in the US and the Euro Area are respectively
2.7% and 2.1%.48 Given these empirical values of fh; fg, we calibrate fh; fg by setting
fhne; fneg = fh; fg. We report the parameter values in Table 4.
Table 4: Calibrated parameter values
 n   zh zf h f  s  h f h f
2:46 0:035 0:05 1:28 1:02 1:02 1:92 1:84 0:58 0:50 0:80 0:16 0:63 0:33 0:56
Under these calibrated parameter values, we can compute the e¤ects of ination on R&D
in the two economies and compare these values to our regression estimate in Section 2. We
nd that when h increases by 1%, R&D/GDP in the US decreases by 0.266 percent (percent
change). When f increases by 1%, R&D/GDP in the Euro Area decreases by 0.448 percent
(percent change). These simulated values for the semi-elasticity of R&D with respect to
ination are in line with the panel regression estimate of -0.374 reported in Section 2.
We can also numerically simulate the best-response functions of the two economies.
Figure 2 shows that the best-response functions are downward-sloping implying that the
monetary policy instruments fh; fg are strategic substitutes. Under the CES aggrega-
tor in (6), one can show that given  > 1, the market share of nal goods (i.e., from (7),
phy;tY
h
t =Ct = 
=(phy;t)
 1) is decreasing in h and increasing in f due to an international
business-stealing e¤ect of technologies fZht ; Zft g on market share.49 Therefore, when the
foreign government reduces f to increase foreign technology, the optimal response of the
home government is also to reduce h in order to improve domestic technology and com-
pete for market share. In this case, the best-response functions should be upward-sloping;
however, there is also a technology-spillover e¤ect across countries. From (28), the level of
consumption in the home country is chtN
h
t = p
h
y;tY
h
t = 
Ct=(p
h
y;t)
 1, where the aggregate
production of Ct is
Ct =
h
(Zht L
h
x;t)
( 1)= + (1  )(Zft Lfx;t)( 1)=
i=( 1)
, (61)
which uses (6), (19) and the analogous equation for Y ft . We see that an increase in foreign
technology Zft increases aggregate consumption, which in turn increases home consumption
(holding phy;t constant) capturing the technology-spillover e¤ect. In other words, when the
foreign government reduces f to increase foreign technology, the optimal response of the
home government is to increase h to free-ride on the technology improvement in the foreign
country. Equation (61) shows that an increase in Zft is a closer substitute to an increase
in Zht as the substitution elasticity  increases. The fact that the best-response functions
46Data source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database.
47Data source: Federal Reserve Economic Data and ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
48Data source: Eurostat.
49Derivations available in an unpublished appendix.
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are downward-sloping in Figure 2 implies that this technology-spillover e¤ect dominates the
international business-stealing e¤ect under the calibrated parameter values.
Figure 1: Non-cooperative governmentsbest-response functions
Finally, our policy experiments are as follows. First, we lower the ination rates in both
economies from the Nash equilibrium to their globally optimal level and examine the e¤ects
on social welfare fUh; U fg. Second, we consider a unilateral deviation from the Nash equi-
librium to the optimal ination rate that maximizes aggregate welfare of the two economies
and examine the asymmetric implications on the two economies. Under the current set of
calibrated parameter values, the optimal nominal interest rates in both economies are zero
(i.e., the Friedman rule is socially optimal) implying that the optimal ination rates are
fh ; fg = f r; rg. We rst consider the case in which the two governments are coop-
erative and agree to decrease the ination rates from the Nash equilibrium to the globally
optimal level of  r. In this case, the welfare gains are nonnegligible and equivalent to a
permanent increase in consumption of 1.038% in the US and 0.249% in the Euro Area as
reported in Table 5.50 However, a unilateral deviation to decrease the ination rate from the
Nash equilibrium would hurt the domestic economy and only benet the foreign economy,
and the cross-country spillover e¤ects are quantitatively signicant. For example, we nd
that a unilateral decrease in the ination rate in the Euro Area would improve welfare in
the US by 1.079% but reduce its own welfare by 0.213%. Intuitively, a decrease in ination
raises labor supply Lf via the CIA constraints, but the resulting expansion in production in
the Euro Area increases consumption in both economies. It is useful to note that the welfare
cost of decreasing leisure is borne by the Euro Area but by not the US. As a result, the US
experiences a welfare gain whereas the Euro Area experiences a welfare loss. The opposite
is true when the US unilaterally decreases ination. We see in Table 5 that the Euro Area
generally experiences a larger welfare loss (or a smaller welfare gain) than the US. The reason
50Welfare gains are expressed as the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
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is that the money-consumption ratio is much higher in the Euro Area (0.63) than in the US
(0.16), which in turn implies that the CIA parameters are larger in the Euro Area than in
the US as reported in Table 4. In this case, when ination decreases, leisure decreases by a
larger amount in the Euro Area than in the US, generating the asymmetric welfare e¤ects
across the two countries.
Table 5: Welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
Uh U f
Cooperative policy fh;fg= f r; rg 1:038% 0:249%
Unilateral policy fh;fg= fhne; rg 1:079%  0:213%
Unilateral policy fh;fg= f r; fneg  0:033% 0:470%
5.1 Elasticity of substitution
In this subsection, we perform a robustness check by varying the value of the substitution
elasticity  2 [2:2; 3:1],51 while holding other parameter values constant. We nd that the
Nash equilibrium ination rates are above the optimal ination rates as before. However,
as the substitution elasticity  increases, the strength of the international business-stealing
e¤ect increases relative to the technology spillover e¤ect. As a result, the degree of ina-
tionary bias becomes smaller, which in turn implies that the welfare gains of decreasing the
ination rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level also become smaller. Table
6 summarizes the welfare e¤ects when both countries decrease the ination rates from the
Nash equilibrium to the optimal level. The qualitative pattern remains the same as before.
In particular, the US experiences a larger welfare gain than the Euro Area. At  = 3:1,
the Euro Area experiences a small welfare loss, but the overall welfare (i.e., Uh + U f) still
increases.
Table 6: Welfare e¤ects of monetary policy under  2 [2:2; 3:1]
Cooperative policy fh;fg= f r; rg Uh U f
 = 2:2 1:630% 0:406%
 = 2:7 0:667% 0:133%
 = 3:1 0:263%  0:015%
5.2 CIA parameter on consumption
In this subsection, we perform another robustness check by varying the parameter value of
the CIA constraint on consumption while holding other parameter values constant. In this
case, the Nash equilibrium ination rates continue to be above the optimal ination rates.
As before, Table 7 reports the welfare gains when both countries decrease the ination rates
from the Nash equilibrium to the level prescribed by the Friedman rule. As the degree of
the CIA constraint on consumption in the Euro Area decreases to the level in the US (i.e.,
51This range of values corresponds to the range of median estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006) for
the period from 1990 to 2001, which is the most recent period in their data sample.
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h = f = 0:16), the welfare e¤ects become smaller in both countries. Nevertheless, even in
the absence of the CIA constraints on consumption (i.e., h = f = 0), the welfare gains of
decreasing ination from the Nash equilibrium remain nonnegligible.
Table 7: Welfare e¤ects of monetary policy under h= f2 f0; 0:16g
Cooperative policy fh;fg= f r; rg Uh U f
h= f= 0:16 0:937% 0:140%
h= f= 0 0:261% 0:121%
5.3 CIA parameter on R&D
In this subsection, we recalibrate the parameter values by targeting the estimated semi-
elasticity of R&D/GDP with respect to ination in Section 2. In particular, we drop the
Nash-equilibrium ination rates as empirical moments and recalibrate the values of fh; fg
such that the model replicates a semi-elasticity of -0.374 in both economies. The recalibrated
values of fh; fg are f0:468; 0:467g. Under these parameter values, we compute the Nash
equilibrium ination rates, which are fhne; fneg = f3:70%; 2:08%g. In this case, the Nash
equilibrium continues to exhibit an inationary bias. Therefore, we proceed to quantify the
welfare e¤ects of decreasing the ination rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal
level. Table 8 reports the results, which show that both the qualitative pattern and the
quantitative magnitude of the welfare e¤ects of ination are largely the same as before.
Table 8: Welfare e¤ects of monetary policy under fh; fg = f0:468; 0:467g
Uh U f
Cooperative policy fh;fg= f r; rg 0:989% 0:356%
Unilateral policy fh;fg= fhne; rg 1:055%  0:195%
Unilateral policy fh;fg= f r; fneg  0:057% 0:561%
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination in an open-
economy version of the Schumpeterian growth model with CIA constraints on consumption
and R&D investment. We nd that economic growth and social welfare are a¤ected by
domestic and foreign ination. Furthermore, the cross-country welfare e¤ects of ination are
quantitatively signicant. These spillover e¤ects give rise to an inationary bias in the Nash
equilibrium and prevent noncooperative governments from implementing optimal policies
even in the long run. According to our simulation results, the optimal nominal interest rates
in the two countries are generally zero;52 therefore, a supranational authority choosing a
uniform interest rate to maximize global welfare would improve welfare. Our analysis serves
52This is true except for one special case when we set h = f = 0.
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to provide a quantication of the potential welfare gains from a common monetary policy in
monetary unions.53
A natural question that arises is whether monetary policy still plays a role when scal
policy, such as R&D subsidies, is present. In the case of inelastic labor supply, increasing
R&D subsidies and decreasing ination would have identical e¤ects on the economy by
shifting labor from production to R&D. In this case, if R&D subsidies are chosen optimally,
then monetary policy would play a redundant role in the innovation process. However, in
the case of elastic labor supply and in the absence of lump-sum tax, nancing R&D subsidies
could create distortionary e¤ects on the economy. For example, suppose R&D subsidies are
nanced by a labor-income tax. Then, increasing R&D subsidies raises the income tax rate
and reduces labor supply. In contrast, decreasing ination increases labor supply via the two
CIA constraints as shown in (32). Therefore, the e¤ects of these two instruments are not
identical. More importantly, scal policy is often determined via a political process in which
participants may not have the objective of maximizing social welfare. In contrast, monetary
policy is often viewed as less likely to be subject to such political inuences.
For future research in this literature, it would be useful to have more empirical evidence on
the determinants of the CIA constraints, which potentially di¤er in magnitude across coun-
tries. Furthermore, our analysis is based on a semi-endogenous-growth version of the Schum-
peterian model that removes scale e¤ects. It may be a fruitful extension to explore the cross-
country spillover e¤ects of ination in other vintages of the Schumpeterian growth model,
such as the second-generation Schumpeterian growth models in Peretto (1998), Howitt (1999)
and Segerstrom (2000). We leave this interesting extension to future research.
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Appendix A
Denition of equilibrium. The equilibrium is a time path of allocations flht ; lft ; cht ; cft ; Ct;
Y ht ; Y
f
t ; X
h
t (j); X
f
t (j); L
h
x;t(j); L
f
x;t(j); L
h
r;t(); L
f
r;t()g1t=0, a time path of prices fwht ; wft ; phc;t; pfc;t;
phy;t; p
f
y;t; p
h
x;t(j); p
f
x;t(j); v
h
t ; v
f
t ; "tg1t=0 and a time path of policies fht ; ft ; ht ;  ft g1t=0 such that
the following conditions are satised:
 the representative household in country h chooses flht ; cht g to maximize lifetime utility
taking fwht ; phc;t; ht ; ht g as given;
 the representative household in country f chooses flft ; cft g to maximize lifetime utility
taking fwft ; pfc;t; ft ;  ft g as given;
 competitive nal-good rms produce fCtg to maximize prot taking fphc;t; pfc;t; phy;t; pfy;tg
as given;
 competitive intermediate-good rms in country h produce fY ht g to maximize prot
taking fphy;t; phx;t(j)g as given;
 competitive intermediate-good rms in country f produce fY ft g to maximize prot
taking fpfy;t; pfx;t(j)g as given;
 monopolistic rms in country h produce fXht (j)g and choose fphx;t(j)g to maximize
prot taking fwht g as given;
 monopolistic rms in country f produce fXft (j)g and choose fpfx;t(j)g to maximize
prot taking fwft g as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs in country h employ fLhr;t()g to maximize expected
prot taking fwht ; vht g as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs in country f employ fLfr;t()g to maximize expected
prot taking fwft ; vft g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that chtNht + cftN ft = Ct;
 the market-clearing conditions for labor in the two countries hold such that lhtNht =
Lhx;t + L
h
r;t and l
f
tN
f
t = L
f
x;t + L
f
r;t; and
 the value of assets equals the value of monopolistic rms in each country such that
ahtN
h
t = v
h
t and a
f
tN
f
t = v
f
t .
Proof of Proposition 1. We assume that the monetary authority adjusts ht to ensure a
stationary ih.54 We dene a transformed variable t  phy;tY ht =vht . Then, di¤erentiating t
with respect to t yields
_t
t
 _p
h
y;t
phy;t
+
_Y ht
Y ht
  _v
h
t
vht
=
_cht
cht
+ n  _v
h
t
vht
; (A1)
54In the steady state, a stationary h ensures a stationary ih = h + + (2  )n.
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where the second equality follows from (28). Combining (14), (16) and (18), the no-arbitrage
condition for vht can be expressed as
_vht
vht
= rht  

  1


ht +
'
 
lhr;t
1 
&ht
; (A2)
where &ht  Zht =
 
Nht
1 
. Substituting the Euler equation _cht =c
h
t = r
h
t     n and (A2) into
(A1) yields
_t
t
=

  1


ht  
'
 
lhr;t
1 
&ht
  : (A3)
To derive a relationship between lhr;t, 
h
t and &
h
t , we rst use p
h
y;t = exp
R 1
0
ln phx;t(j)dj

and
(13) to derive phy;t = w
h
t =Z
h
t . Substituting this condition, (19) and (28) into (4) yields
lht = 1  h
 
1 + hih

lhx;t: (A4)
Then, using (15) and (17) yields
ht =

1 + hih

 
lhr;t
lhx;t
!
ht : (A5)
Combining (A4), (A5) and lht = l
h
r;t + l
h
x;t, we obtain
ht =
(
1 + h
 
1 + hih
  
1 + hih


) 
lhr;t
1  lhr;t
!
ht : (A6)
Combining (18) and (A6) yields the following relationship between lhr;t, 
h
t and &
h
t :
lhr;t = J
h
 
ht ; &
h
t

, (A7)
where
Jhh =  
(
1 + h
 
1 + hih
  
1 + hih

' [1 +  (1  lhr ) =lhr ]
) 
lhr

&h < 0, (A8)
Jh&h =  
(
1 + h
 
1 + hih
  
1 + hih

' [1 +  (1  lhr ) =lhr ]
) 
lhr

h < 0. (A9)
Based on (21), (33), (A3) and (A7), the following dynamic system in terms of ht and &
h
t can
be described by
_t
t
=

  1


ht  
'

lhr;t
 
ht ; &
h
t
1 
&ht
  , (A10)
_&ht
&ht
=
 
' ln zh
 
lhr;t
 
ht ; &
h
t
1 
&ht
  (1  )n. (A11)
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Linearizing (A10) and (A11) around the steady-state equilibrium yields
_ht
_&ht

=

a11 a12
a21 a22

| {z }
Jacobian matrix

ht   h
&ht   &h

, (A12)
where
a11 = 
h
"
  1


  ' (1  )
(lhr )
 &h
Jhh
#
> 0; a12 =  
'
 
lhr
1 
h
(&h)2

(1  ) &h
lhr
Jh&h   1

> 0,
a21 =
 
' ln zh

(1  )
(lhr )

Jhh < 0; a22 =
 
' ln zh
  
lhr
1 
&h

(1  ) &h
lhr
Jh&h   1

< 0.
Let 1 and 2 be the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system. The determinant of
Jacobian is given by
Det = 12 = a11a22   a21a12 =

  1

  
' ln zh
  
lhr
1 
h
&h

(1  ) &h
lhr
Jh&h   1

< 0.
(A13)
As indicated in (A13), the two characteristic roots have opposite signs. Together with the
fact that ht is a jump variable and &
h
t is a state variable, these ndings imply that the
dynamic system displays saddle-path stability.
Figure 2: Phase diagram
The phase diagram is plotted in Figure 2, where the _ht = 0 locus is steeper than the
_&ht = 0 locus. Figure 2 shows that 
h
t and &
h
t gradually converge to a unique steady-state
equilibrium in point A. An analogous proof would show that ft and &
f
t also gradually
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converge to their steady-state values. When fht ; &ht ;ft ; &ft g are all in the steady state, it
can be shown that the global economy is on a unique and stable balanced growth path.
Proof of Proposition 2. Setting _ht = 0 and _&
h
t = 0 in (A10) and (A11) yields the
steady-state equilibrium values of ht and &
h
t given by
h =


  1

(1  )n
ln zh
+ 

, (A14)
&h =
' ln zh
(1  )n
 
lhr
1 
, (A15)
where lhr is still an endogenous variable. From (A15) and (18), the steady-state arrival rate
of innovation in country h is exogenous and given by
h =
(1  )n
ln zh
. (A16)
Substituting (A16) into (A14) yields h = 
 
+ h

= (  1). We make use of this con-
dition and (A5) to obtain (25). Solving (25), (A4) and lh = lhr + l
h
x yields the steady-state
equilibrium labor allocations in (30), (31) and (32). Substituting (30) into (A15) yields the
steady-state value of &h.
Proof of Proposition 3. The analogous expression of (39) for U f is given by
U f = [ln lhx + (1  ) ln lhr ] + (1  )[ln lfx + (1  ) ln lfr ] + f ln(1  lf ). (A17)
The analogous expressions of (30)-(32) in country f are
lfr =
 1
1+f if
f
+f
1 + f (1 + f if ) +  1
1+f if
f
+f
, (A18)
lfx =
1
1 + f (1 + f if ) +  1
1+f if
f
+f
, (A19)
lf =
1 +  1
1+f if
f
+f
1 + f (1 + f if ) +  1
1+f if
f
+f
, (A20)
where if = f + r = f + + n+ gfc = 
f + + (2  )n, which is increasing in f . Under
inelastic labor supply, we set h = f = 0 in (30)-(32) and (A18)-(A20). Then, we substitute
the resulting expressions into Uh +U f from (39) and (A17) and di¤erentiate it with respect
to fh; fg to obtain the optimal ination rates given by
h =
1
h

  1
1  
h
+ h
  1

  r, (A21)
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f =
1
f

  1
1  
f
+ f
  1

  r. (A22)
Therefore, fh ; fg = fhne; fneg in (42) and its analogous equation for fne.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the absence of the CIA constraint on consumption, we set
h = f = 0 in (30)-(32) and (A18)-(A20). The government in country h chooses h to
maximize the welfare of the representative household in country h. We substitute (30)-(32)
and (A18)-(A19) into Uh in (39) and then di¤erentiate it with respect to h to obtain the
Nash-equilibrium ination rate hne in country h given by (48). Similarly, the government
in country f chooses f to maximize the welfare of the representative household in country
f . We substitute (30)-(31) and (A18)-(A20) into U f in (A17) and then di¤erentiate it with
respect to f to obtain the Nash-equilibrium ination rate fne in country f given by (49).
The cooperative governments choose fh; fg to maximize the welfare of both domestic and
foreign households. We substitute (30)-(32) and (A18)-(A20) into Uh + U f from (39) and
(A17). Then, we di¤erentiate Uh+U f with respect to fh; fg to obtain the optimal ination
rates given by (50) and (51). Taking the di¤erence between hne and 
h
 as shown in (52) and
then di¤erentiating it with respect to , we nd that
@
 
hne   h

@
=
1 + h 
h + 1
2 h2h (1  ) 
h
h + 
> 0. (A23)
Equation (A23) shows that the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination
rates is monotonically increasing in the market power of rms.
Proof of Proposition 5. In the absence of the CIA constraint on R&D, we set h = f = 0
in (30)-(32) and (A18)-(A20). The government in country h chooses h to maximize the
welfare of the representative household in country h. We substitute (30)-(32) and (A18)-
(A19) into Uh in (39) and then di¤erentiate it with respect to h to obtain the Nash-
equilibrium ination rate hne in country h given by (56). Similarly, the government in
country f chooses f to maximize the welfare of the representative household in country
f . We substitute (30)-(31) and (A18)-(A20) into U f in (A17) and then di¤erentiate it with
respect to f to obtain the Nash-equilibrium ination rate fne in country f given by (57).
The cooperative governments choose fh; fg to maximize the welfare of both domestic and
foreign households. We substitute (30)-(32) and (A18)-(A20) into Uh + U f from (39) and
(A17). Then, we di¤erentiate Uh+U f with respect to fh; fg to obtain the optimal ination
rates given by (58) and (59). Taking the di¤erence between hne and 
h
 as shown in (60) and
then di¤erentiating it with respect to , we nd that
@
 
hne   h

@
=   1
2

h + 
1
2h (2  ) < 0. (A24)
Equation (A24) shows that the wedge the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination rates is
monotonically decreasing in the market power of rms.
36
Appendix B (not for publication)
Table 9: Panel regressions on HP-detrended Ination
Dependent variable: 100*log(R&D/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressor
Cyclical ination
p-values
Observations
Adj-R2
-0.1530
(0.797)
648
0.4036
-0.2504
(0.261)
648
0.9171
-0.1949
(0.361)
648
0.9286
Notes: FE denotes xed e¤ects. GDP is real PPP-adjusted GDP
Table 10: Panel regressions using the number of patent grants at USPTO
Dependent variable: 100*log(Patents/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressor
Ination
p-values
Observations
Adj-R2
-2.6463
(0.000)
1136
0.0959
-0.7828
(0.000)
1136
0.9165
-0.3087
(0.000)
1136
0.9371
Notes: FE denotes xed e¤ects. GDP is real PPP-adjusted GDP
Table 11: Panel regressions using the number of patent grants at USPTO
Dependent variable: 100*log(Patents/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressor
Trend ination
p-values
Observations
Adj-R2
-3.4842
(0.000)
1136
0.1265
-1.2313
(0.000)
1136
0.9205
-0.5647
(0.000)
1136
0.9419
Notes: FE denotes xed e¤ects. GDP is real PPP-adjusted GDP
Table 12: Panel regressions using the number of patent grants at USPTO
Dependent variable: 100*log(Patents/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressor
Cyclical ination
p-values
Observations
Adj-R2
0.0282
(0.964)
1136
-0.0009
0.1864
(0.321)
1136
0.9078
0.1830
(0.248)
1136
0.9403
Notes: FE denotes xed e¤ects. GDP is real PPP-adjusted GDP
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B.1 The price index phy;t . Combining (9) and (10) yields
Y ht = exp
Z 1
0
ln
 
phy;tY
h
t

=phx;t (j)

dj

. (B1)
Then, manipulating (B1) yields the standard price index of Y ht given by p
h
y;t = exp
nR 1
0
ln[phx;t (j)]dj
o
.
B.2 Proof of r   ghv =  on the BGP. First, substituting (16) and (17) into (27), we
obtain chtN
h
t = !
h
t +w
h
t L
h
x;t. Combining this condition, (14) and (15) yields c
h
tN
h
t = p
h
y;tY
h
t as
shown in (28). Then, substituting (18) into (17) and di¤erentiating it with respect to time
yields
_vht
vht
=
_wht
wht
+ n; (B2)
where we have used (22). Using (15) and (28), (B2) can be rearranged as
ghv 
_vht
vht
=
_cht
cht
+ n: (B3)
Finally, we make use of the familiar Euler equation _cht =c
h
t = r      n and (B3) to derive
ghv = r    on the BGP.
B.3 The rst-best optimal ratio of R&D to production labor. Using standard
dynamic optimization, we maximize a lifetime utility function given by
Uh =
Z 1
0
e t
h
ln cht + ln c
f
t + 
h ln(1  lht ) + f ln(1  lft )
i
dt; (B4)
subject to (6), (7), (8), (19), (21), (28), the analogous equations for fY ft ; _Zft =Zft ; cftN ft g,
lht = l
h
x;t + l
h
r;t and l
f
t = l
f
x;t + l
f
r;t. We obtain the optimal labor ratio l
h
r;t=l
h
x;t given by
lhr;t
lhx;t
=
ht
 
' ln zh
  
lhr;tN
h
t
1 
2= (1  ) : (B5)
The intertemporal optimality condition is
  _
h
t
ht
=
2
htZ
h
t
  : (B6)
Substituting (22) into (B5), we derive
lhr;t
lhx;t
=
(1  )2 n
2
htZ
h
t (B7)
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Then, di¤erentiating (B7) with respect to time yields _ht =
h
t =   (1  )n. Combining this
equation and (B6) and substituting it into (B7), we derive the optimal ratio ~lhr =~l
h
x as shown
in (43).
B.4 The non-cooperative governmentsbest-response functions and their welfare
functions. Substituting (7) into (28) yields chtN
h
t = 
 
Y ht
( 1)=
(Ct)
1=. Substituting
this condition along with (6) and ghc = (1  )n into (35) yields
Uh =
   1

lnY h0 +
1
   1 ln


 
Y h0
 1
 + (1  )

Y f0
 1


+ h ln
 
1  lh ; (B8)
where we have dropped all the exogenous terms. Substituting (37)-(38) into (B8) yields
Uh =
   1


(1  ) ln lhr + ln lhx

(B9)
+
1
   1 ln
8<:
" 
' ln zh
  
lhr
1 
lhx
(1  )n
# 1

+ (1  )
" 
' ln zf
  
lfr
1 
lfx
(1  )n

1  s
s
2 # 1 9=;
+h ln
 
1  lh ;
where we have once again dropped the exogenous terms. The government in country h
chooses h to maximize the welfare of the representative household in country h. We sub-
stitute (30)-(32) into Uh in (B9) and then di¤erentiate it with respect to h to obtain the
best-response function in country h given by
(1  )  h +  hh  1 + hih+ h 1 + h  1 + hih	 	h = h
 1

+ =
+(1 )
h
(B10)
where
	h  (  1)
hh   hh  h +   1 + hih2
1 + hih
; (B11)
h  h (  1)
h

h
 
1 + hih

+ h
 
1 + hih

+ h
 
h + 
  
1 + hih
2 
1 + hih
  
1 + hih
 ; (B12)

h 
"
Zf0 l
f
x
Zh0 l
h
x

1  s
s
# 1
: (B13)
Moreover, the analogous expression of (B9) for U f is given by
U f =
   1


(1  ) ln lfr + ln lfx

(B14)
+
1
   1 ln
8<:
" 
' ln zh
  
lhr
1 
lhx
(1  )n

s
1  s
2 # 1
+ (1  )
" 
' ln zf
  
lfr
1 
lfx
(1  )n
# 1

9=;
+f ln
 
1  lf :
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The analogous expression of (B10) for the foreign governments best-response function is
given by
(1  )  f +  ff  1 + f if+ f 1 + f  1 + f if	 	f = f
 1

+ (1 )=

f+(1 )
(B15)
where
	f  (  1)
ff   ff  f +   1 + f if2
1 + f if
; (B16)
f  f (  1)
f

f
 
1 + f if

+ f
 
1 + f if

+ f
 
f + 
  
1 + f if
2 
1 + f if
  
1 + f if
 ; (B17)

f 

Zh0 l
h
x
Zf0 l
f
x

s
1  s
 1

: (B18)
We use (B10) and (B15) to numerically simulate the best-response functions of the two
economies and use (B9) and (B14) to compute the welfare e¤ect of monetary policy. Figure
1 and Table 5 present the results, respectively.
B.5 International business-stealing e¤ect. Combining (7) and (28) yields chtN
h
t =Ct =

 
Y ht =Ct
( 1)=
: Substituting (6) and (37) into this condition yields
chNh
C
=

 + (1  ) 
h ; (B19)
where 
h is a function of the variables fZh0 ; Zf0 ; lhx; lfxg satisfying (B13). Substituting (30),
(31) and (38) into (B19) and di¤erentiating it with respect to h yields
@
 
chNh=C

@h
=   (1  ) (   1) 

h=
[ + (1  ) 
h]2
(
h
 1

+ =
+(1 )
h
)
< 0, (B20)
where we have used (B10). Substituting (38), (A18) and (A19) into (B19) and di¤erentiating
it with respect to f yields
@
 
chNh=C

@f
=
 (1  ) (   1) 
h=
[ + (1  ) 
h]2
(
f
 1

+ (1 )=

f+(1 )
)
> 0, (B21)
where we have used (B15). Based on (B20) and (B21), the market share of nal goods is
decreasing in h and increasing in f due to the international business-stealing e¤ect via
technologies fZh0 ; Zf0 g.
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